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PEOPLE V. FREEMAN-NO END RUNS ON THE
OBSCENITY FIELD OR YOU CAN'T CATCH
ME FROM BEHIND
What is pornography? From the proverbial man-in-the-street the
answer may be, "I don't know, but I know it when I see it." On the
other hand, his answer might be, "I don't know, but I know what I like,"
since the pornography industry has grown in the last three decades into a
multibillion dollar business.' "Adult" motion pictures, videotapes, cable
and satellite television programs, "dial-a-porn," X-rated computer net-
works, paperback books and peep shows are all part of this huge
enterprise.2
Still, politicians, behavioral and social scientists, and law enforce-
ment officials have argued that the mass distribution of such materials is
causally related to increased violence and lawlessness.3 For the health of
our society, they urge, sexually-related materials must be regulated and
in their more extreme versions banned.' Although some scientists and
sociologists disagree,5 all states and the federal government have tried to
limit the spread of sexual materials by the enactment of obscenity
statutes.6
Easing, let alone stopping, this wave of written and visual sexual
stimulants has been easier to do in theory than in practice. The First
Amendment of the United States Constitution protects free expression.'
If an expression is deemed "obscene," however, it is beyond the amend-
ment's haven.' Still, enforcement of the federal and the states' obscenity
standards can be arbitrary and problematic. The obscenity laws contain
1. See Final Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, at 341, 346-77
(1986) [hereinafter Final Report]. In 1985 the estimated box office receipts for "adult only"
motion picture theaters were five hundred million dollars and estimated sales of "adult" video
tapes were three hundred fifteen million dollars. Id. at 352-54. In 1982 the estimated monthly
sales in the United States of thirteen "mainstream" sexually explicit magazines were approxi-
mately thirty-eight and a half million dollars. Id. at 360. The magazines were CHERI, CHIC,
CLUB MAGAZINE, CLUB INTERNATIONAL, FORUM, GALLERY MAGAZINE, GENESIS, HIGH
SOCIETY, HUSTLER, OUI, PENTHOUSE, PLAYBOY and PLAYGIRL.
2. See Final Report at 346-77.
3. Id. at 271-89.
4. Id. at 31-48.
5. Id. at 49-50.
6. See The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, at 37 (1970).
7. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I, § 1.
8. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Supreme Court in Roth held that
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such amorphous terms that police officers are practically left to their own
judgment in arresting violators. In addition, a jury may have a good deal
of trouble in deciding whether any given piece of sexually-related mate-
rial passes the necessary constitutional standards.9 In a diverse commu-
nity, such as Los Angeles, a consensus on a phrase like "prurient
interest" can be quite difficult and a criminal conviction for violating an
obscenity statute even more so. What is "smut" to one person may be
"beauty" to another. Accordingly, law enforcement officials have at-
tempted different approaches in seeking to stem the tide of pornographic
materials.10
One such approach is the use of a state's pandering laws, which
make it illegal to hire someone for the purposes of prostitution. In Cali-
fornia, a photographer and a distributor of sexually explicit material
were successfully prosecuted 1 under that state's pandering laws.I2 Simi-
larly, a New York court held that a producer of a sexually explicit mo-
tion picture could also be prosecuted under a pandering statute.'
3
Consequently, while pandering laws were originally enacted to halt the
an expression is obscene if it "deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." This
is judged by the average person "applying contemporary community standards."
9. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), set out the United States Supreme Court's
standard for obscenity: (1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (2) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law, and (3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.
10. See Bronson, Obscenity: Prosecutorial Techniques, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181 (1973).
11. See People v. Fixler, 56 Cal. App. 3d 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1976); People ex rel.
Van De Kamp v. American Art Enter., Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 142 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1977).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 266i (Deering 1985), states that
[a]ny person who: (a) procures another person for the purpose of prostitution; or
(b) by promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, per-
suades or encourages another person to become a prostitute; or (c) procures for an-
other person a place as an inmate in a house of prostitution or as an inmate of any
place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state; or (d) by
promises, threats, violence or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades or
encourages an inmate of a house of prostitution, or any other place in which prostitu-
tion is encouraged or allowed, to remain therein as an inmate; or (e) by fraud or
artifice, or by duress of person or goods, or by abuse of any position of confidence or
authority, procures another person for the purpose of prostitution, or to enter any
place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state, or to come into
this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution; or (f) receives or gives, or
agrees to receive or give, any money or thing of value for procuring, or attempting to
procure, another person for the purpose of prostitution, or to come into this state or
leave this state for the purpose of prostitution, is guilty of pandering, a felony, and is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or six years, or, where
the other person is under 16 years of age, is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison for three, six, or eight years.
13. People v. Kovner, 96 Misc. 2d 414, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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spread of prostitution, it was only a matter of time before a filmmaker in
California was prosecuted under the pandering statute.
Harold Freeman was that filmmaker. After producing a sexually
explicit motion picture, he was convicted of five counts of pandering.
His conviction was affirmed by the state court of appeal.' 4 But in a
somewhat surprising decision,"5 the California Supreme Court reversed.
The court held that the pandering statute was not intended to apply to
Freeman's conduct as a filmmaker and that "such a conviction would
rather obviously place a substantial burden on the exercise of protected
First Amendment rights."' 6 Thus, this new approach to the problem of
pornography was foreclosed and the payment of wages to a consenting
adult to engage in sexual activities in a motion picture, which is not ob-
scene, will not support a conviction under the California pandering
statute.
FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1983, Harold Freeman, a producer of over one hundred sexually-
oriented motion pictures, hired male and female actors to perform ex-
plicit sexual acts in the filming of a motion picture entitled Caught From
Behind, Part IL' 7 Freeman paid a fee to the World Modeling Agency for
casting the talent and paid for the use of a house as the production's
locale. '8
Freeman was charged with five counts of pandering for the hiring of
five actresses for the film' 9 and was found guilty on all five counts. The
court of appeal, in a split decision, affirmed Freeman's conviction.' 0 The
California Supreme Court granted review on appeal.2'
Pursuant to the pandering law, Penal Code section 266i, the trial
court was required to sentence the defendant to a minimum of three
14. People v. Freeman, 198 Cal. App. 3d 292, 233 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1987), rev'd, 46 Cal. 3d
419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988).
15. People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988).
16. Id at 422, 758 P.2d at 1132, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
17. These acts included sexual intercourse, oral copulation and sodomy.
18. Besides being paid as the owner of the house in which the movie was filmed, Nancy
Conger was also permitted to appear in the picture.
19. He was not charged with pandering for the hiring of the male performers, nor was he
charged with violating the California obscenity law, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311-311.2 (Deering
1985 & Supp. 1988).
20. People v. Freeman, 198 Cal. App. 3d 292, 233 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1987), rev'd, 46 Cal. 3d
419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988).
21. People v. Freeman, 734 P.2d 562, 236 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1987).
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years in prison.22 However, the trial court found that imposition of a
three year prison term in this case would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. The court therefore granted Freeman probation. The court
of appeal affirmed this sentence.23
On August 25, 1988, the California Supreme Court unanimously de-
clared that "the prosecution of defendant under the pandering statute
must be viewed as a somewhat transparent attempt at an 'end run'
around the First Amendment and the state obscenity laws."' 24 Accord-
ingly, the court overturned Freeman's conviction. The California
Supreme Court's reasoning paralleled the position of the dissenting jus-
tice and contrasted strongly with the majority and concurring opinions in
the court of appeal.
DECISION OF THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL
FOR THE SECOND DISTRICT
Majority and Concurring Opinions
In this first appeal of the trial court decision 25 (hereinafter "Free-
man I"), Justice Kingsley, in affirming Freeman's conviction,26 stated
that although movies and books are protected by the first amendment,
22. See supra note 12. A 1982 amendment to the statute substituted terms of "three, four,
or six years" for the previous terms of "two, three, or four years."
A 1983 amendment to Penal Code § 1203.065 provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of
sentence be suspended for, any person convicted of violating ... Section 266i." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1203.065 (Deering 1985).
23. People v. Freeman, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 234 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1987). In the sentenc-
ing of Freeman, the court of appeal was persuaded that a mandatory jail term was uncalled for
in these circumstances. The court cited In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 217 (1972), a case in which the California Supreme Court held the provisions of Penal
Code § 314, making a second offense of indecent exposure a felony punishable by imprison-
ment for not less than one year, were barred by the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment in the California Constitution. Likewise, the court found that, since the harm to
the public was minimal, imposing the same sentence upon Freeman as on a defendant who was
convicted of armed robbery would be cruel and unusual punishment.
24. People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 423, 758 P.2d 1128, 1130, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598, 599
(1988).
25. People v. Freeman, 198 Cal. App. 3d 292, 233 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1987), rev'd, 46 Cal. 3d
419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988). Harold Freeman was originally charged, along
with several other defendants in companion cases, with the identical crime of felony pandering
after a 1979 arrest. At that time conviction under the statute carried no mandatory sentence.
The charges against Freeman were later dropped.
When rearrested, Freeman filed a pre-trial motion to have the charges dropped. The
motion was denied and Freeman was convicted in the subsequent trial. Telephone conversa-
tion with Stuart Goldfarb, Counsel for Defendant (September 1988).
26. People v. Freeman, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 294, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 511, rev'd, 46 Cal. 3d
419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988).
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that constitutional protection was not applicable in this case since "a
criminal act is not protected under the First Amendment merely because
it occurs within the context of a motion picture production." '27 Since
Freeman hired the actresses to engage in "acts or [sic] prostitution,
which is defined in numerous California cases as the engaging in sexual
conduct for money"" and the actresses did perform sexual acts for
money, the defendant was guilty.
29
Justice Arguelles based his concurring opinion, for the most part, on
two cases, People v. Fixler30 and People ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American
Art Enterprises, Inc. 31 In Fixler, a photographer and a photo editor who
hired a young girl to be photographed while engaging in lewd and sexual
acts were convicted of violating the pandering statute. In American Art
Enterprises, a building used for both hiring people to engage in sex acts
which were photographed and the production and distribution of sexu-
ally explicit magazines was held to be a place where prostitution oc-
curred and thus subject to the provisions of the Red Light Abatement
Law.2 Justice Argulles cited these cases for the proposition that being
paid to have sexual intercourse while being photographed is prostitu-
tion.33 In addition, Penal Code section 266i can be used, according to
Fixler, to prosecute a photographer and a film editor for hiring a woman
to engage in lewd acts.34 Justice Arguelles reasoned that since there is no
essential difference between still photographs and motion pictures, the
statute was applicable to Freeman.35
As to first amendment considerations, Justice Arguelles stated that
the prosecution here, like that in Fixler, was based on conduct and not on
a communication of ideas.36 Although the film was protected under the
first amendment, Freeman was not shielded from prosecution for the ille-
gal acts committed while producing the film. 37 Those acts of hiring ac-
tresses to have sex on camera were not protected expression, but rather
criminal conduct, according to Justice Arguelles, which fell within the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 56 Cal. App. 3d 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1976).
31. 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 142 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1977).
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11225 (Deering 1985).
33. People v. Freeman, 198 Cal. App. 3d 292, 294, 233 Cal. Rptr. 510, 511 (1987), rev'd,
46 Cal. 3d 419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 295, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
37. Id.
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confines of section 266i.3"
Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice McClosky cited Burton v. Munici-
pal Court,3 9 in which the California Supreme Court referred to Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson ' in discussing the relationship between movies
and the bill of rights.4" According to Justice McClosky, there was no
doubt that expression by means of motion pictures was included within
the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments.4 2 Barrows v. Mu-
nicipal Court,43 a case involving alleged illegal activities performed on a
stage, was cited for the proposition that conduct which would be prohib-
ited in the streets may be protected within the context of a theatrical
production.' That is, a theatrical production would lose first amend-
ment protection only if found to be obscene, while the identical conduct
on the street does not have such protection, whether obscene or not.
Further, Justice McClosky, quoting Barrows, stated that "any more re-
strictive rule could annihilate in a stroke much of the modern theater and
cinema."'45
The movie Caught From Behind, Part 1H was never declared obscene
by any judicial authority. Nor was there evidence that the California
Legislature intended Penal Code section 266i to prevent the production
or distribution of motion pictures depicting sex acts between consenting
adults. Freeman's purpose was to profit from the making of a motion
38. Id.
39. 68 Cal. 2d 684, 441 P.2d 281, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1968). In Burton the court held that a
motion picture licensing ordinance in Los Angeles vested practically unlimited discretionary
powers upon city officials in granting permits. The ordinance was declared unconstitutional by
the court as a prior restraint on first amendment rights.
40. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). In Burstyn the Supreme Court examined provisions of a New
York law which authorized the denial of a motion picture exhibition license upon a censor's
finding that the movie in question was "sacreligious." The Court declared the statute void as a
prior restraint on freedom of speech and of the press under the first amendment as it applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment.
41. People v. Freeman, 198 Cal. App. 3d 292, 295, 233 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512 (1987), rev'd,
46 Cal. 3d 419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988).
42. Id.
43. 1 Cal. 3d 821, 464 P.2d 483, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970). Barrows was a California case
in which actors in a play entitled "The Beard" were charged with violations of the California
Penal Code for disorderly conduct and speaking obscene words in public. The California
Supreme Court held that the statutes in question were not intended to apply to theatrical
performances.
44. People v. Freeman, 198 Cal. App. 3d 292, 296, 233 Cal. Rptr. 510, 512 (1987), rev'd,
46 Cal. 3d 419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988).
45. Id. (quoting Barrows v. Municipal Court, 1 Cal. 3d at 831, 464 P.2d at 489, 83 Cal.
Rptr. at 825 (1970)).
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picture and not from hiring someone for the purpose of prostitution.
Therefore, Justice McClosky stated he would reverse the defendant's
conviction.46
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
On appeal to the supreme court, the defendant contended that the
lower courts had erred in applying the pandering statute to Freeman's
activities, asserting that the statute was never intended to be used as a
trap to ensnare filmmakers creating nonobscene materials. In addition,
the defendant argued that the lower courts had erred in stating that the
first amendment did not shelter Freeman's activities. The California
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals47 (hereinaf-
ter Freeman II), deciding this case on statutory language and on first
amendment grounds.
Statutory Language
The court stated that the interpretation of Penal Code section 266i
depends on the definition of prostitution.48 This definition is derived
from California Penal Code section 647(b), which states that prostitution
"includes any lewd act between persons for money .... 49 For the defini-
tion of "lewd act" the court referred to Pryor v. Municipal Court.50 In
Pryor, the term was defined as "touching of the genitals, buttocks or fe-
male breast for the purpose of sexual arousal. . . ."" The court then
quoted People v. Hill52 for the proposition that for a lewd act to consti-
tute prostitution, the "touching" must be done for the purpose of sexual
46. Freeman, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 298, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
47. People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988).
48. Id. at 424, 758 P.2d at 1130, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (Deering 1985). Section 647(b) states in part:
"Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misde-
meanor: ....
(b) Who solicits or who engages in any act of prostitution. As used in this subdivision,
'prostitution' includes any lewd act between persons for money or other consideration." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 647(b) (Deering 1985).
50. 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979). In Pryor the defendant
sought a writ of prohibition to bar a retrial on charges of violating Penal Code § 647(a). The
California Supreme Court, in denying the writ, adopted a new construction of the statute and
stated that, as so construed, it was not unconstitutionally vague.
51. Id. at 256, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
52. 103 Cal. App. 3d 525, 163 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1980). In Hill the court reversed the trial
court's conviction of the defendant on pimping and pandering charges, holding that it was
reversible error to fail to explain to the jury what was included in the terms "lewd and disso-
lute acts."
1989]
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arousal or gratification of the customer or prostitute. 53
In Freeman H the actresses were paid for their performances in a
film not adjudged obscene and not for the purpose of either Freeman's or
the actresses' sexual arousal or gratification. 4 Therefore, Freeman "did
not engage in the requisite conduct nor did he have the requisite mens
rea or purpose to establish procurement for purposes of prostitution.
55
First Amendment
In discussing the constitutional considerations, the court's starting
point was that the rights of free expression set out in the first amendment
protects a nonobscene motion picture.5 6 Subjecting a producer and di-
rector of a nonobscene motion picture to prosecution for pandering
would substantially burden the exercise of first amendment rights.
57 If
Penal Code section 266i was extended in this manner, producers of
"films of unquestioned artistic and social merit, as well as films made for
medical or educational purposes"58 would be subject to criminal sanc-
tions.59
The court also found that the lower court's distinction between
"speech" and "conduct" was untenable.' To determine the permis-
sability of governmental regulation of conduct which contains elements
of speech, the court examined the standards set forth in United States v.
O'Brien.6 ' The court found that the prosecution of a filmmaker, like
Freeman, under section 266i violated the O'Brien requirement that the
government interest be unrelated to the suppression of free speech.62 The
governmental interests here were the prevention of profiteering from
prostitution and the prevention of the spread of sexually transmitted dis-
53. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 424, 758 P.2d at 1130, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (quoting Hill, 103
Cal. App. 3d at 534-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 105).
54. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 424-25, 758 P.2d at 1131, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (1988).
55. Id. at 425, 758 P.2d at 1131, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 426, 758 P.2d at 1132, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
58. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 426, 758 P.2d at 1132, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 427, 758 P.2d at 1132, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
61. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In this well-known "draft card burning" case, the United States
Supreme Court set out a four part test to determine whether a governmental regulation of
conduct which also contained elements of speech was constitutional:
(1) Is the regulation within the constitutional powers of the government? (2) Is the govern-
mental interest important or substantial? (3) Is the governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of free speech? (4) Are the incidental restrictions on first amendment interests no
greater than necessary to further the governmental interest?
62. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 427, 758 P.2d at 1132, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 602 (1988).
[Vol. 9
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eases.6 3 Neither interest was valid when "the self-evident purpose of the
prosecuting authority in bringing these charges was to prevent profiteer-
ing from pornography without the necessity of proving obscenity.""
The alleged governmental interests directly suppress free expression and,
"in the context of a pandering prosecution for the making of a nonob-
scene motion picture, [are] not credible."65
The supreme court considered the lower court's reliance on Fixler
66
and American Art Enterprises67 misplaced. The alleged acts of "prostitu-
tion" procured by Freeman were not crimes independent from the pay-
ment for the right to photograph the performance.68 Since the sexual
acts here were completely lawful, occurring between consenting adults
and not in a public place, no crime was committed.
69
The court distinguished the Fixler decision as involving aiding and
abetting unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor in violation of Penal
Code section 261.570 and criticized both Fixier and American Art Enter-
prises for relying on the crime of hiring a photographic model to perform
sex acts as being an act of prostitution.7 In a footnote, the court stated
that to the extent Fixer, American Art Enterprises and a third case, Peo-
ple v. Zeihm, 7 2 held that the payment of wages to an actor or model who
performs a sexual act in filming or photography for publication consti-
tutes prostitution and therefore can support a pandering conviction,
whether or not the film or photograph is obscene, these cases are
disapproved.7"
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 56 Cal. App. 3d 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1976). In Fixier the Court of Appeal in the
Second District of California found the defendants guilty of violating the pandering statute.
The defendants had paid a fourteen year old girl to be photographed while engaging in sexual
activity. The photos were later published.
67. 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 142 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1977). In American Art Enterprises the Court
of Appeal in the Second District held that the Red Light Abatement Law, Penal Code
§ 11225, was applicable to the buildings of the defendant, American Art Enterprises, Inc.
Models were paid to engage in sexual acts in these buildings and this activity was photo-
graphed for later publication. The court found this to constitute prostitution and, therefore,
susceptible to an injunction under the above-stated law.
68. People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 429, 758 P.2d 1128, 1134, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603
(1988).
69. Id.
70. "[Statutory Rape]
Unlawful sexual intercourse is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the
wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 261.5 (Deering 1985, Supp. 1988).
71. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 428, 758 P.2d at 1133, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03 (1988).
72. 40 Cal. App. 3d 1085, 115 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1974).
73. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 428, 758 P.2d at 1133, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 603 n.6 (1988).
1989]
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The court also distinguished a number of other cases relied upon by
the prosecution. In the New York case of People v. Kovner, 74 the defend-
ant, a producer of sexually-oriented films, was charged with promoting
prostitution under New York Penal Law section 230.00. He moved to
have the charges dismissed. The court denied the motion, holding that
neither the statute in question nor any court interpretations of the statute
excluded sexual conduct by a paid performer from the definition of pros-
titution. According to the court in Freeman II, the New York court in
Kovner based its decision on the New York Legislature's intent to in-
clude engaging in explicit sex for pay in a film within the definition of
prostitution.75
In People v. Maita, 76 the defendant, an owner and manager of a the-
ater specializing in "on-stage sex acts," was convicted for pimping and
pandering. In affirming the convictions, the court of appeal in California
held that any indirect infringement on constitutionally protected expres-
sion was justified, as the infringement was narrowly tailored to further an
important government interest, controlling prostitution. In turn, con-
trolling prostitution was unrelated to the suppression of free speech. The
California Supreme Court in Freeman II stated that Maita mistakenly
relied upon Fixier.77 In addition, the court stated that Maita was distin-
guishable as the theater owner there actually paid his stage performers to
have sex with paying customers.78 Thus, his conviction for procuring
persons for the purposes of prostitution was correct.79
Similarly, State v. Kravitz,80 an Oregon case in which a theater
owner was convicted of promoting prostitution, also involved sexual rela-
tions between audience members and a paid performer in the defendant's
nightclub.8' Finally, United States v. Roeder,82 a district court case in
Kansas in which the defendant paid a young woman to be filmed while
74. 96 Misc. 2d 414, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
75. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 429, 758 P.2d at 1134, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 603 (1988).
76. 157 Cal. App. 3d 309, 203 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1984).
77. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 429, 758 P.2d at 1134, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (1988).
78. Id. at 430, 758 P.2d at 1134, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
79. Id.
80. 14 Or. App. 243, 511 P.2d 844 (1973). The defendant in Kravitz, a theater owner who
paid a man to have real and simulated sex on stage with a woman, was convicted of promoting
prostitution. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
81. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d at 430, 758 P.2d at 1134, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (1988).
82. 526 F.2d 736 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). The defendant in
Roeder travelled with a young woman from Missouri to Kansas, where he paid her to be filmed
while having sex. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas convicted the
defendant on a violation of the Mann Act, which proscribes transporting a female across state
lines for the purpose of prostitution. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction.
[Vol. 9
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having sex, was distinguished as being a violation of the Mann Act. 3
The court stated that the identical conduct would not be criminal if done
within one state.84
Accordingly, the court found that Freeman's conduct was not crim-
inal as charged and, therefore, reversed Freeman's pandering conviction
which was "based solely on the payment of wages to the actresses in his
film.)s
8 5
SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS
In order to understand the California Supreme Court's decision in
Freeman II, it is necessary to analyze the history of the California pan-
dering statute to see whether Freeman's conduct was intended to be pro-
hibited. In addition, it is necessary to analyze the cases that preceded
Freeman II in order to understand the groundwork upon which the pros-
ecutor based his case. Finally, it is helpful to examine other jurisdictions'
case law to see if a pandering law has ever been used to convict a pro-
ducer of adult films and whether such a conviction was relevant to Free-
man II.
Legislative History of Penal Code Section 266i
The present pandering statute is derived from the original statute
passed in 1911 by the California Legislature.86 The original pandering
law was intended to prevent the spread of prostitution by making it a
83. The Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988), makes it a crime to
transport a woman across state lines for immoral purposes.
84. Freeman. 46 Cal. 3d at 430, 758 P.2d at 1134, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (1988).
85. Id
86. 1911 Cal. Stat. ch. 14 § 1. The original statute read:
Any person who shall procure a female inmate for a house of prostitution, or who, by
promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, shall cause, induce, persuade
or encourage a female person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution, or shall
procure for a female person a place as inmate in house of prostitution or as an inmate
of any place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state, or any
person who shall, by promises, threats, violence or by any device or scheme, cause,
induce, persuade or encourage an inmate of a house of prostitution or any other place
in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed to remain therein as such inmate, or
any person who shall, by fraud or artifice, or by duress of person or goods, or by
abuse of any position of confidence or authority, procure any female person to be-
come an inmate of a house of ill-fame, or to enter any place in which prostitution is
encouraged or allowed within this state, or to come into this state or leave this state
for the purpose of prostitution, or who shall receive or give, or agree to receive or
give, any money or thing of value for procuring, or attempting to procure, any female
person to become an inmate of a house of ill-fame within this state, or to come into
this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution, shall be guilty of a felony,
to wit: pandering, and upon conviction for an offense under this act shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for a period of not less than one year nor more
than ten years.
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felony to "cause, induce, persuade or encourage a female person to be-
come an inmate of a house of prostitution, or ... (to) procure for a
female person a place as inmate in a house of prostitution." 7 As in all
other states, except for Nevada, prostitution was and is illegal in Califor-
nia," and the pandering law was intended to attach penalties to those
who would gain by it.8 9 The 1911 statute focused only on preventing the
proliferation of houses of prostitution.9'
In 1953 the California Legislature passed the present statute,91
which was similar in intent to the 1911 law and still specifically referred
to "procur[ing] another person for the purpose of prostitution. "92
In 1969, the legislature passed an amendment to the 1953 act.93 The
statute was made gender neutral and applied to all forms of prostitution
and not just to "houses of ill-repute."
Penal Code section 266i was also amended in 1976, 1981, 1982 and
1983; each amendment changing the sentencing requirements.94 The
87. Id
88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (Deering 1985).
89. 1911 Cal. Stat. ch. 14 § 1.
90. Idr
91. 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 32 § 4.
92. Id
93. The 1969 amendment to § 266i:
(1) Substituted "another person for the purpose" for "a female inmate for a house"
after "(a) procures"; (2) substituted "another" for "a female" after "encourages";
(3) substituted "a prostitute" for "an inmate of a house of prostitution" after "to
become"; (4) substituted "another" for "a female" after "procures for"; (5) substi-
tuted "another" for "any female" after "procures"; (6) substituted "for the purpose
of prostitution" for "to become an inmate of a house of ill-fame" before "or to enter
any place"; (7) substituted "another" for "any female" after "attempting to pro-
cure"; (8) substituted "for the purpose of prostitution" for "to become an inmate of a
house of ill-fame within this State" before "or to come into this state"; and (9) de-
leted the former second paragraph which concerned the ability of a person referred
to in this section to be a competent witness for the prosecution, notwithstanding the
fact that they were married to the accused.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 266i (Deering 1985).
94. The 1976 amendment substituted "two, three, or four years" for "not less than one
year nor more than 10 years" at the end of the section.
The 1981 amendment substituted "or four years, or, where the other person is under 14
years of age, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years" for
"or four years" at the end of the section.
The 1982 amendment 1) amended the first paragraph by substituting (a) "three, four, or
six years" for "two, three, or four years;" and (b) "16 years" for "14 years;" and 2) added the
second paragraph (see 1983 amendment below).
The 1983 amendment deleted the former second paragraph which read: "Except as pro-
vided in Section 1203.065 and notwithstanding any other provision of law, probation shall not
be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, any person
convicted under this section unless the person is required to serve a term of imprisonment in
the state prison for three years as a condition of probation or suspension." (Deering 1985).
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statute's application to "procuring another person for the purposes of
prostitution" remained unchanged.
Analysis of Section 266i
It is unlikely that the legislature intended to extend the breadth of
Penal Code section 266i to include activities such as Freeman's adult
filmmaking, Fixler's sexual photography or American Art Enterprises'
hiring of models and publishing of adult magazines. If otherwise, there
would be some mention of that intent in either the language of the statute
or in the legislative history.
The 1911 law was intended to halt the spread of prostitution by
making it illegal for someone to gain by procuring a woman for a house
of prostitution.9" There is nothing in the statute that forbids profiting by
hiring actors or models, even if those actors or models are engaging in
sexual acts.96 It is impossible to include Freeman's activities within the
language "or who shall receive or give, or agree to receive or give, any
money or thing of value for procuring, or attempting to procure, any
female person to become an inmate of a house of ill-fame within this state
...."9 In hiring actresses to appear in his film, Freeman was assuredly
not hiring them to take up residence in a "house of ill-fame." And
outside of preventing the spread of houses of prostitution, there is noth-
ing in the 1911 pandering statute that indicates any additional or alter-
nate purpose.98
In 1911 book and magazine publishing was a fraction of the giant
industry it is today and the motion picture industry was in its infancy.
There was no need for the legislators of that era to prohibit the
photographing or filming of sexual activity for profit when it was a minor
or even nonexistent problem. The legislature did not have the foresight,
or more truthfully the clairvoyance, to see the future of "adult
entertainment."
The same might be said concerning the 1953 California Legislature
which passed the present statute.99 Although motion picture and pub-
lishing had grown to be multimillion dollar industries, the adult filmmak-
ing business was small. The marketing for such films and photographs
was done surreptitiously through advertisements containing obscure lan-
95. 1911 Cal. Stat. ch. 14 § 1.
96. Although there have been laws in the Northern Hemisphere regulating "wicked" ma-
terial as far back as 1711. See Final Report, supra note 1, at 304, quoting Tribe, Technical
Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1970).
97. 1911 Cal. Stat. ch. 14 § 1.
98. Id.
99. 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 32 § 4.
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guage or through "under the counter" sales in mainstream businesses."
The 1953 statute still referred to "procur[ing] another person for the pur-
pose of prostitution," '' and contained no language prohibiting the con-
duct in which Freeman was engaging.
By 1969, the adult filmmaking industry had grown considerably.
Yet the California Legislature's purpose in passing the 1969 amendment
to section 266i, as described by the Legislative Counsel's Digest, was to
provide
that [the] crime of pandering is committed when [a] person pro-
cures another person for purpose of prostitution, rather than [a]
female person for [a] house of prostitution, or induces another
person to become [a] prostitute, rather than [a] female person
to become [an] inmate of [a] house of prostitution, or receives
money or [a] thing of value for procuring another person for
[the] purpose of prostitution, rather than [a] female person for
[a] house of prostitution.' 0 2
The statute was made to apply to both sexes and all forms of prostitution.
Neither Assemblymen Beverly or Gonsalves, who introduced this
amendment, nor any other legislator, intended to broaden the sweep of
this law to include producers of "adult" material, even though they were
more than likely aware of the growth of the industry.
0 3
The entire history of the pandering statute reveals that the legisla-
ture intended to regulate the proliferation of, initially, houses of prostiti-
tion and, later, all types of prostitution in section 266i, and not speech,
such as the production of a motion picture. Therefore, any broader in-
terpretation of Penal Code section 266i would have to depend on the
definition of "prostitution." That is, if "prostitution" encompassed being
paid while being filmed or photographed performing sexual acts, then
anyone paying for this act could also be guilty of pandering. California
Penal Code section 647(b) defines "prostitution" as "any lewd act be-
tween persons for money or other consideration."'" The California
Supreme Court in Freeman II stated that, "the definition of 'prostitution'
(and ultimately, therefore, the definition of 'pandering') depends on the
definition of a 'lewd act.' """ The court went on to conclude that for a
"lewd act" to constitute prostitution, certain "touching" for the purposes
100. See Final Report, supra note 1, at 13.
101. 1953 Cal. Stat. ch. 32 § 4.
102. Assembly Bill 818, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1969 REGULAR SESSION.
103. Id
104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(b) (Deering 1985).
105. People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 424, 758 P.2d 1128, 1130, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598, 600
(1988).
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of sexual arousal or gratification of the customer or the prostitute must
occur."° Therefore, there must be touching between a customer and a
prostitute for the purpose of the sexual gratification of either for there to
be an act of prostitution.
The activities Freeman paid for do not come within this definition.
Freeman was the "customer" in the transaction, in that he paid for the
alleged illegal acts. Yet there was no evidence presented that the ac-
tresses and Freeman ever touched. Further, even if they had touched, it
was not for the purposes of either's sexual gratification, but rather for the
purpose of setting up the shot for inclusion as part of the motion
picture. 107
The statute defining "prostitution" was also never intended to in-
clude paid for acts performed before either a still or motion picture cam-
era. As the California Supreme Court said in writing about section 647,
"nothing in the legislative history of the section indicates that it was
meant to apply to activities, such as theatrical performances, which are
prima facie within the ambit of First Amendment protection."' '° If the
statute does not apply to theatrical performances or other first amend-
ment protected activities, like motion pictures, then hiring someone to
appear in such a protected activity cannot be pandering. Section 266i,
therefore, does not have the scope necessary to catch Freeman and other
producers of sexually-oriented materials within its ambit. Freeman hired
actresses for the purpose of appearing in his motion picture, not for the
purpose of profiting from acts of prostitution.
From Fixler to Freeman
People v. Fixler1 9 was the first case in which a defendant who was
engaged in expressive activities, namely photography, was convicted
106. Id.
107. A more prosaic definition of "prostitution" can be found in WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY at 597 (Concise ed. 1962), which defines the term "prostitute" as meaning "to
sell the services of (oneself or another) for purposes of sexual intercourse." The question arises
whether the performers were hired to appear in Freeman's film or whether they were hired to
have sexual intercourse. Would the actresses have been hired if they had agreed to appear in
the film, but refused to have sexual relations? This may not be a truly relevant question. If
any actor in a motion picture refused to do an act in a film (including such acts as cursing or
acting viciously) when required by the role, it is doubtful whether he or she would be permit-
ted to remain on the production set. An act, whether it be shouting or sexually caressing,
written into the script of a motion picture must be performed by the actor. If it is not per-
formed, the value of the performance is lessened, as is the value of the movie.
108. Barrows v. Municipal Court, 1 Cal. 3d 821, 826, 464 P.2d 483, 486, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819,
822 (1970).
109. 56 Cal. App. 3d 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1976).
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under a pandering statute. As such, it formed the basis for the convic-
tion in Freeman I.
In Fixer, the Second District California Court of Appeal affirmed
the convictions of two individuals, Fred Fixler and Harry Lee Utterback,
Jr., who had allegedly violated Penal Code section 266i. Utterback was a
photographer and Fixler was a photo editor. Both men worked for
American Art Enterprises, Inc., a publisher of "magazines devoted to the
depiction of sexual activity."' 10 They were prosecuted for hiring a four-
teen year old girl named Patricia to perform various sexual activities on
approximately eight to fifteen different occasions. II
The court found that Patricia engaged in prostitution because she
engaged in sexual intercourse for money. Thus, the defendants were
guilty of pandering under the statute.1 12 Fixler and Utterback had ar-
gued that since they had hired Patricia to be photographed, they could
not be convicted of pandering without proof that the photos violated the
obscenity laws. 1 3 The court stated that the defendants' basic argument
was "somewhat clothed with First Amendment protection,"14 but found
this fact irrelevant. The court distinguished between "[t]he manner of
obtaining the photographs and the ultimate use to which those photo-
graphs might be put. .... 1,1I5 In other words, the criminal act of hiring
an individual to engage in sex for money was distinct from the right of
free expression exercised by publishing a nonobscene photograph. The
latter is expression protected by the first amendment, while the former is
conduct and open to state regulation. The court cited O'Brien 16 to bol-
ster the distinction between conduct and speech.
The court's decision in Fix/er rested on two points: 1) that although
publishing the magazine was permissible as free speech, the conduct of
hiring someone to engage in sex, which acts were photographed, was not;
and 2) hiring someone to have sex while being photographed was engag-
ing in pandering because, by definition, to be paid to perform in sexual
activity is to be a prostitute.117 That is, since a person is a prostitute
when paid to have sex, the person who hires the "prostitute" is guilty of
pandering, no matter where the sex act occurs. On this basis, the court
110. Id. at 324, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 325, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
117. People v. Fixler, 56 Cal. App. 3d 321, 325, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363, 365 (1976).
[Vol. 9
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
have considered the Autry analysis as it was an earlier Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals opinion.
Finally, the decisions in Rooney and Platinum provide examples of
how other courts have dealt with the issue of whether television exhibi-
tion rights should extend to videocassette display. While both the
Rooney and Platinum licenses contained broader language than the Co-
hen license, the factual similarities demand a consistent application of the
rules. Platinum adopted the Rooney conclusion equating exhibition by
means of television with exhibition by means of videocassette reproduc-
tion. In so concluding, Rooney applied the rule set forth in Bartsch
where that court expressly adopted Nimmer's "ambiguous penumbra"
analysis. It follows then, that the Cohen court could have applied the
rules adopted in Platinum and Rooney because both cases explicitly re-
ferred to the factual situation at issue in the Cohen case, whether televi-
sion exhibition rights ought to extend to videocassette display. In failing
to address the issue, the Cohen court inadequately analyzed the case.
Consequently, Cohen should be in line with the earlier cases because
of the factual similarities. The Ninth Circuit's conflicting opinion in Co-
hen is thus inconsistent with those cases and Nimmer's accepted
approach.
The Ninth Circuit Failed To Address The Public Performance Issue
In its consideration of whether Paramount infringed Cohen's rights
as copyright owner, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals neglected to con-
sider that home videocassette display has already been determined not to
be a public performance. Without a public performance there can be no
violation of the Copyright Act. Paramount addressed the public per-
formance issue because the Cohen court differentiated between videocas-
sette exhibition and exhibition by means of television by comparing the
amount of control viewers possessed with each type of display. The Co-
hen license granted Paramount the "authority... to record, in any man-
ner, medium, form or language . . . and to make copies of such
recordings... and to perform said musical composition everywhere, all
in accordance with the terms, conditions, and limitations hereinafter set
forth .... ,,7 One of the limitations restricted the exhibition of Medium
Cool "by means of television." Thus, the restriction on the television
exhibition rights applied only to the right to perform the musical compo-
sition. The court's holding, however, combined public performances by
broadcast or cable transmissions to the consumer with private perform-
107. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1988).
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ances entirely within the control of the consumer, thereby misconstruing
the Act. 108
Contrary to the Cohen court's opinion, many courts and the House
and Senate Committee Reports on section 101 have concluded that home
videocassette display does not constitute a public performance." 9 As a
result, there can be no copyright infringement. The legislative history on
section 101 states that:
Under the definitions of "perform," "display, .... publicly," and
"transmit" in Section 101.... any act by which the initial per-
formance or display is transmitted, repeated, or made to recur
would itself be a "performance" or "display" under the bill, it
would not be actionable as an infringement unless it were done
"publicly," as defined in Section 101.110
Thus, the legislative intent behind section 101 implies that home video-
cassette display is not included in the public performance definition in
section 106 of the Act.
Many decisions have supported the idea that home videocassette
display does not constitute a public performance."' The basic premise
underlying this rationale was best summed up by the court in Jerome H.
Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories.'1 2 The court stated
that "[w]hile statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situations
not fairly within their scope, they should not be so narrowly construed as
to permit their evasion because of changing habits due to new inventions
and discoveries."' 13
Various courts have relied on the JH. Remick decision to define
what is and what is not a public performance under section 101 of the
Copyright Act. Courts adopting the JH. Remick rationale to encompass
newly developed technological advances imply that this rationale should
extend to the argument that home videocassette display does not consti-
tute a public performance. The United States Supreme Court in Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. "4 accepted the J.H.
108. Brief for Appellee at 8, Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1988).
109. See infra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
110. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-60 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. at 63 (1976).
111. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.
v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
112. 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925).
113. Id
114. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). The Court held that "[b]roadcasters perform. Viewers do not
perform." Id. at 398.
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affirmed the defendants' convictions.1 1 8
In American Art Enterprises, I the Los Angeles District Attorney
sought to close American Art Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter "Ameri-
can"), "a corporate empire engaged in the publication and distribution of
pornographic materials" 2 ' under the Red Light Abatement Law. 21
American's headquarters in Chatsworth, California was used for the
photographing of "men and women who perform sexual intercourse in
every conceivable variant,"'' 22 who were hired for that purpose. The trial
court found that the building in Chatsworth was not used for the purpose
of prostitution as that term is used in Penal Code section 11225 and that
the law was not applicable to a building used for publishing and distrib-
uting books and magazines.' 23 Since the Red Light Abatement Law was
not applicable to American, the court determined that an injunction forc-
ing the closing of American was not permissible.'
24
The California Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court decision.' 25  Quoting Fixler, the court stated that "sexual inter-
course for hire by the models whose activity is photographed for the pub-
lications of the American Art empire is prostitution."' 26 Thus, absent a
constitutional restriction, 27 the court held applicable the Red Light
Abatement Law, which states that "[e]very building or place used for the
purpose of ... prostitution . . . is a nuisance which shall be enjoined
"128
In considering the possible constitutional restrictions on the stat-
ute's application to American, the court of appeal cited O'Brien for the
proposition that conduct which contains elements of speech may be regu-
118. Id. at 327, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
119. 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 142 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1977).
120. Id. at 527, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40.
121. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11225 (Deering 1985), which reads:
Every building or place used for the purpose of illegal gambling as defined by state
law or local ordinance, lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, and every building or
place in or upon which acts of illegal gambling as defined by state law or local ordi-
nance, lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, are held or occur, is a nuisance which
shall be enjoined, abated and prevented, whether it is a public or private nuisance.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply the definition of a nuisance to
a private residence where illegal gambling is conducted on an intermittent basis and
without the purpose of producing profit for the owner or occupier of the premises.
122. People ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enter., Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 527,
142 Cal. Rptr. 338, 340 (1977).
123. Id at 528, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 527, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
126. American Art Enter., Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d at 529, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
127. Id.
128. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11225.
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lated if the regulation furthers an important governmental interest and if
any incidental restriction on speech is no greater than necessary. 1 29 As
the prohibition of pandering and prostitution is a substantial government
interest and the premises in question were used for prostitution, the court
found that applying Penal Code section 11225 was appropriate. 3 °
In People v. Maita, 3 the trial court had found the owner of a thea-
ter, who hired women to perform sex acts with members of the paying
audience, guilty of pimping under Penal Code section 266h, pandering
per Penal Code section 266i and keeping a house of ill fame and house
for prostitution under Penal Code sections 315 and 316.132 On appeal
the defendant argued that, since the conduct in his theater was declared
not obscene, it was protected expression under the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution. 33 As the Second District Court of Ap-
peal did in Fixier and American Art Enterprises, the First District Court
of Appeal stated that, pursuant to O'Brien, "when 'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a suffi-
ciently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment free-
doms." 134 The court stated that the state had the authority to prosecute
the defendant under the pimping and pandering statutes as "the pimping
and pandering laws do not prohibit the presentation of live, nude en-
tertainment-they merely direct that the entertainer cannot have sexual
relations with the audience." 1 3' The court further relied upon Fixier and
American Art Enterprises in rejecting the defendant's contention that the
statutes were not applicable unless the on-stage performances were
obscene. 136
FROM FIXLER TO FREEMAN. A STEP FORWARD OR
BACKWARD? AN ANALYSIS
To affirm the convictions of the defendants in Fixler, American Art
Enterprises and Maita, the courts relied upon two key factors: 1) the defi-
nition of prostitution, as used in the pandering statute in Fixler and
Maita and in the Red Light Abatement Law in American Art Enterprises,
129. People ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enter., Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 530,
142 Cal. Rptr. 338, 341 (1977).
130. Id. at 531, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
131. 157 Cal. App. 3d 309, 203 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1984).
132. Id. at 313, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
133. Id. at 315, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 316, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
136. Maita, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 316-17, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89.
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included being hired to be photographed while performing sexual activi-
ties; and 2) the distinction between conduct and speech. The California
Supreme Court in Freeman I differed from the courts of appeal in its
analysis of both factors.
The Definition of Prostitution
The lower courts' decisions in Fixier, American Art Enterprises,
Maita and Freeman I depended partially on the definition of "prostitu-
tion," which in turn depended upon definitions of the terms "lewd act"
and "customer" and payment for the lewd act.137 The supreme court in
Freeman II stated that statutory and case law set forth that "for a
'lewd'. . . act to constitute 'prostitution,' " there must be some intimate
touching between the prostitute and customer "for the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification of the customer or of the prostitute."' 138 If the
actresses could somehow be defined as "prostitutes," the defendant in
Freeman II was still not involved in any intimate touching of the women
and thus was not a "customer" as that term is understood in the context
of the statutes and case law.
Even if a nontouching party who pays for a sexual "transaction"
between two other people could be termed a "customer," the defendant
in Freeman II did not participate in a "lewd" act constituting prostitu-
tion, because he did not derive "sexual arousal or gratification" from the
act. '39
Finally, the court in Freeman II stated that the payment by the de-
fendant was not for sexual arousal, but for the actors' performances. ' °
Therefore, the defendant in Freeman II did not engage in pandering, be-
cause the people he hired did not engage in prostitution. I4'
The expansion of the term "prostitute" to include the acts of the
performers in Fixier, American Art Enterprises and Freeman 1, and,
therefore, the expansion of the pandering statute to include the activities
of the defendants, was correctly dismissed by the California Supreme
Court in Freeman I. 42 In none of these cases were the defendants pay-
ing to participate in the sexual acts. Further, "prostitution" is not an
accurate reflection of the activity for which the performers in Fixer,
137. People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 424, 758 P.2d 1128, 1130, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598, 600
(1988).
138. Id. (quoting People v. Hill, 103 Cal. App. 3d 525, 534-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. 99, 105
(1980)).
139. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 424-25, 758 P.2d 1128, 1131, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598, 600 (1988).
140. Id. at 424-25, 758 P.2d at 1131, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
141. Id. at 425, 758 P.2d at 1131, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
142. Id. at 423-25, 758 P.2d at 1130-31, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 599-600.
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American Art Enterprises and Freeman I were paid. They received
money, not for having sex, but for being photographed. Their sexual
conduct would have been useless to the defendants in these cases if they
were not photographed. Since the models and actresses were being paid
to be photographed, not to have sex, and the sexual activities engaged in
were legal, 4 3 there was no prostitution involved in Freeman HI, Fixler or
in American Art Enterprises and that basis of the lower courts' rulings in
those cases was declared infirm. 1"
On the other hand, the women in Maita were actually paid by the
theater owner to perform sexual activities with paying customers. 145 The
court in Freeman H stated that that activity was prostitution and, there-
fore, the defendant's conviction for pandering was properly affirmed and
distinguishable from the other cases.146
Besides the above definitional difficulties, in order to apply the pan-
dering statute to the activities in Freeman 1, Fixler and American Art
Enterprises, the parameters of the pandering statute would have to be so
broad as to place even "legitimate" photographers and movie makers in
danger of violating the law. "[A] governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby in-
vade the area of protected freedoms." '14 7 Although the prosecutors in
Freeman H would no doubt deny such an intention, if the term "prosti-
tution" included the activity of actors performing any sexual activity on
film, such a broad sweep would ensnare not only makers of "porno-
graphic" films, but producers of other, less graphic, but surely "adult"
films, which to date have been protected by the guarantees of the first
amendment. 14S
In addition, a photographer would have no way of knowing whether
the picture taken of an intimate caress between models was permissible
or whether in paying the models a crime had been committed. As such,
the statute would be void for vagueness, since no one could be sure
whether or not the activity they were engaged in was prohibited.'
49
143. Id. at 429, 758 P.2d at 1134, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
144. Id. at 428, 758 P.2d at 1133, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 603 n.6.
145. People v. Maita, 157 Cal. App. 3d 309, 319, 203 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (1984).
146. People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 429-30, 758 P.2d 1128, 1134, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598,
604 (1988).
147. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
148. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), in which the motion picture Carnal
Knowledge was declared obscene by local authorities, yet deemed worthy of constitutional
protection by the Supreme Court.
149. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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Finally, interpretating section 266i to include Freeman's activities
would have made all obscenity statutes irrelevant and redundant. No
prosecutor would bother going through the laborious and difficult pro-
cess of convincing a jury that a given work did not have some redeeming
value if all he had to prove was that the performers engaged in a sexual
act and that the producer paid for that performance. As the court stated
in Freeman II, such an "end run" around the obscenity statute must be
rejected. 15o
The Distinction Between "Conduct" and "Speech"
The second factor in Freeman II, Fixier, American Art Enterprises
and Maita was the courts' distinguishing between "conduct" and
"speech." In O'Brien, the defendant was convicted in the district court
in Massachusetts for burning his draft card.' 5 ' After the First Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the defendant's activity
was an exercise of free speech, the United States Supreme Court rein-
stated the conviction.' 52 The Court found that the conviction was justi-
fied as the regulation: 1) was within the constitutional power of the
government; 2) furthers a substantial governmental interest; 3) the gov-
ernmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
4) any incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to further that interest.
53
The California Supreme Court in Freeman H found that the sup-
pression of free expression was untenable because the "self-evident pur-
pose of the prosecuting authority in bringing these charges was to
prevent profiteering in pornography without the necessity of proving ob-
scenity ' 14 and that "[p]unishment of a motion picture producer for the
making of a nonobscene film .. .has little if anything to do with the
purpose of combatting prostitution," ' the alleged reason for Freeman's
prosecution.
In applying the O'Brien test to the activity in Freeman II, as well as
in Fixer, American Art Enterprises and Maita, Penal Code section 266i
passes the first part of the O'Brien test. Such a pandering statute is
within the constitutional power of the California legislature, since the
150. People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 423, 758 P.2d 1128, 1130, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598, 599
(1988).
151. 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968).
152. Id. at 372.
153. Id. at 376-82.
154. People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 427, 758 P.2d 1128, 1132-33, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598,
602 (1988).
155. Id.
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legislature has the power to enact laws which regulate the activities of the
citizenry. The second part of the test, whether the regulation in question
furthers a substantial government interest, raises the question of what is
the real government interest. Either combatting prostitution or halting
people from profiteering from others' sexual activities may be a valid
government interest. If, however, the real reason for this statute is to
prohibit the production of sexual, yet nonobscene, materials, this is not a
truly substantial government interest. There may, in fact, be a substan-
tial benefit to society from the dissemination of nonobscene sexual mater-
ials, such as greater awareness of the health hazards of sexual
promiscuity and of unwanted pregnancy.
Part three of the O'Brien test, that the governmental interest be un-
related to the suppression of free expression, is even more problematic.
If Freeman, Fixler and American were selling tickets so people could
have sex with their paid performers, as in Maita, there would be no rela-
tion between the interest asserted and any rights of free expression. The
defendants would then be engaging in profiting from others' sexual activ-
ities and not from the production and sale of films and photographs.
This was not the case. The defendants made their profit(from the sale of
materials which were never found to be legally obscene.' 56 Since the
materials were not obscene, these magazines, photographs and movies
are all protected expression under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. It is hard to seriously consider, therefore, the propo-
sition that there would be no suppression of free expression under this
statute.
The fourth part of the O'Brien test also does not stand up to scru-
tiny. The application of the statute in order to halt Freeman's, Fixler's
and American's activities is not a mere "incidental" infringment on free
expression rights. Declaring that producing such materials subjects the
producer to criminal sanctions, without the necessity of proving that the
materials are legally obscene, would result in a total ban, and not an
incidental infringment, on previously protected expression. In addition,
there are other methods of preventing people from profiting from others'
sexual activities, if that is the purpose behind the statute. More narrowly
tailored laws can specifically prohibit certain undesirable conduct. More
exact obscenity laws that are capable of being enforced can be enacted.
To apply the pandering statute in the manner requested by the prosecu-
tors in Freeman H1 is like throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
156. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1972), supra note 9, for the United States
Supreme Court's definition of obscenity.
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Pandering Statutes and their Applications in Other Jurisdictions
Pandering statutes have rarely been applied to activities associated
with free speech. In 1973, the Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Kra-
vitz' 57 upheld the conviction of a theater owner for violating a statute
which proscribed the promotion of prostitution.1 58 This case was factu-
ally similar to the later California case of Maita, in that the defendant
paid someone to appear on stage before a paying audience and engage in
real and simulated sex with another person. 59 The court found that the
activities of the performers were proscribed by the relevant prostitution
statute. 160 The court had no trouble finding the defendant guilty of pro-
moting prostitution.161 The court did not even address the issue of
whether certain sexual activities performed in a theater may be protected
by the first amendment and therefore exempt from prosecution under the
Oregon statute. Since the performers were both paid to have sex on stage
and their activities did not include anything but sex, that is, there was no
"speech" involved, the court did not hesitate in finding the defendant
guilty. 162
People v. Kovner,163 a New York case, was closer to the facts in Free-
man II. The defendant, Harold Kovner, was a producer, director and
distributor of pornographic films. He was charged with two counts of
promoting prostitution and nine counts of obscenity."' The question
before the court was whether Kovner promoted prostitution by hiring
actors and actresses to engage in filmed sexual conduct.' 6  The defend-
ant asserted that actors taking money to participate in a motion picture,
in which they performed sexual acts, did not constitute prostitution
157. 14 Or. App. 243, 511 P.2d 844 (1973).
158. OR. REV. STAT. § 167.012(1)(d) (1987), which reads:
"(1) A person commits the crime of promoting prostitution if, with intent to promote prostitu-
tion, the person knowingly: ...
(d) Engages in any conduct that institutes, aids or facilitates an act or enterprise of
prostitution."
159. Kravitz, 14 Or. App. 243, 244, 511 P.2d 844, 845 (1973).
160. OR. REV. STAT. § 167.007 (1987), which reads:
"(1) A person commits the crime of prostitution if (a) the person engages in or offers or agrees
to engage in sexual conduct or sexual contact in return for a fee; or
(b) the person pays or offers or agrees to pay a fee to engage in sexual conduct or sexual
contact.
(2) Prostitution is a Class A misdemeanor."
161. Kravitz, 14 Or. App. 243, 246, 511 P.2d 844, 846 (1973).
162. Id.
163. 96 Misc. 2d 414, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
164. Id. at 415, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
165. Id.
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within the meaning of the statute. 166 In examining New York's prostitu-
tion statute, 167 the court stated "[t]he legislature, by enacting section
230.00, intended to prohibit certain sexual conduct of a commercial na-
ture," 1 68 and that "[n]either the statute itself (Penal Code 230.00), nor
any decisions interpreting it, exclude sexual conduct by a paid performer
from the definition of prostitution."
'1 69
Although the court in Kovner admitted that the use of the "promot-
ing prostitution" statute1 70 had not been used by New York authorities
before "for the purpose of regulating pornography,"1 71 it found this new
approach acceptable both because the relevant statutes did not prohibit
it, and because another jurisdiction had applied its parallel statute in the
same manner.
172
Analysis of Kovner
The New York court in Kovner stated that since the use of the rele-
vant statute in the manner desired by the prosecutor was not specifically
prohibited, its use is permissable 1 73 In other words, since the New York
State Legislature had not prohibited using the "promoting prostitution"
statute for the purpose of regulating pornography, this new use was
permissable. This is questionable. Problems of due process arise when a
statute is applied in a new and unique fashion. Someone cannot avoid
violating a statute when it is applied by the courts in this new manner.
However, even if such an application of the statute was permissible, one
of the pillars that supported the court's conclusion in Kovner was the
California courts' use of Penal Code section 266i in Fixer and American
Art Enterprises. After Freeman II such support crumbles, and it is un-
166. Id. at 416, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
167. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney 1980), which reads:
"A person is guilty of prostitution when such person engages or agrees or offers to engage in
sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee. Prostitution is a Class B
Misdemeanor."
168. Kovner, 96 Misc. 2d at 416, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
169. Id.
170. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.25 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1988), which reads:
A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the third degree when he knowingly:
1. Advances or profits from prostitution by managing, supervising, controlling or
owning, either alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prosti-
tution business or enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or more prosti-
tutes; or
2. Advances or profits from prostitution of a person less than nineteen years old.
Promoting prostitution in the third degree is a class D felony.
171. Kovner, 96 Misc. 2d at 417, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
172. Id. That state was California and the cited cases were FxIer and American Art
Enterprise&
173. Kovner at 417, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
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certain whether the New York court would decide Kovner identically
today. The only basis of the Kovner decision left is the fact that the New
York legislature did not prohibit the statute's use in such a manner. As
it stands now, the New York Court of Appeal never granted review to
the appellant in Kovner, so there is no certainty on how New York's
highest court would decide this issue.
COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS
The California Supreme Court has taken away a new and potentially
powerful weapon from those who seek to halt the spread of pornographic
materials, whether in films, books or photographs. The pandering stat-
ute has been relegated to its original use of halting the spread of prostitu-
tion by making it illegal for anyone to profit from this crime. In Freeman
II, the court declared that the first amendment rights of filmmakers, as
well as, by implication, photographers and publishers of books and
magazines, prohibits the use of this statute to halt their activities.174
What can be done then in order to stop the spread of magazines and
films that, as some allege, cause both antisocial and sometimes unlawful
acts of sexual violence?
175
A more carefully thought out and worded definition of obscenity is
needed. The creators of all the arts need to know and understand what
the standards of acceptable sexual depiction are and not be left subject to
the vagaries of prosecutorial or judicial discretion. If there is specific
behavior that the legislature of either a state or the federal government
wishes to stop people from viewing, let the legislatures draft legislation to
that effect. In that way, producers of the arts would know what the
scope of the law entails and prosecutors could go after those who go
beyond the law with confidence and without the need to stretch its
boundaries. 176
If such an enforceable obscenity law is not enacted and prosecutors
are forced into creative applications of other laws, such as occurred in
174. "SAN DIEGO-Pandering charges against a Hollywood film producer were dismissed
yesterday because of a recent state Supreme Court ruling banning such prosecutions for adult
films that aren't obscene." Daily Variety, Sept. 29, 1988.
175. See Final Report, supra note 1, at 40.
176. As this article was being written, the California legislature passed an amendment to
§§ 311 and 313 of the Penal Code, which are the state obscenity statutes. This act, entitled the
Deddeh-Polcano Anti-Obscenity Act of 1988, conforms California law to the current federal
standards.
In addition, the United States Senate recently passed a new antiobscenity statute, entitled
"Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988," which addresses primarily, but
not exclusively, child pornography. A companion bill in the House of Representatives is
pending.
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Freeman II, the entire media, arts and entertainment industries are
thrown into a quandry. While the authorities might protest that only the
production of truly "pornographic" material would be subject to prose-
cution, the line between acceptable and unacceptable would often be too
fine to detect. In the past thirty years there have been many "legitimate"
stage and screen productions in which the hired performers engaged in
simulated and real sexual conduct. 177 No doubt the statutes would be
applied most often to "fringe" film and photography producers, those
not in the mainstream of art and commerce. But this selective prosecu-
tion is an unacceptable method of enforcing our criminal statutes. Spe-
cifically, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution are meant for all
members of society, especially those not in the mainstream.
To leave the decision of which films and, therefore which producers,
are "acceptable" in the hands of prosecuting authorities, no matter how
well meaning, is to ask for a shrinking of creative forces in our society.
Without the freedom to fully express themselves, the greatest artists may
be left with only a hollow mandate to create. Surely few would be bold
enough to depict people in passsionate embrace if the threat of prison
constantly loomed over their heads. In addition, the acceptable, and
therefore the nonacceptable, is a constantly changing norm in our soci-
ety. What may be permissible under one authority may change with the
next election. It follows that the arts, even the "adult only" sector of the
arts, is able to perform its function of entertaining and enlightening only
when the laws are not applied so artfully.
Philip M. Cohen
177. Some of the more mainstream films which have included such scenes are The Lovers
with Jeanne Moreau and Jean-Marc Bory (1959), Coming Home with Jon Voight and Jane
Fonda (1978), 100 Rifles with Jim Brown and Raquel Welch (1968), Two Women with Sophia
Loren (1961), Deliverance with Burt Reynolds and Ned Beatty (1972), Last Tango in Paris
with Marion Brando and Maria Schneider (1972), The Devils with Oliver Reed (1971), Risky
Business with Tom Cruise and Rebecca de Mornay (1983), Shampoo with Warren Beatty and
Julie Christie (1975), Stripes with Bill Murray and P.J. Soles (1981), and Rosemary's Baby
with John Cassavetes and Mia Farrow (1968). Sex in the Movies, PREMIERE MAGAZINE, Sept.
1988.
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